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Abstract
For supporting the analysis of railway interlocking
systems in the early stage of their design we pro-
pose the use of model checking. We investigate the
use of the formal modelling language CSP and the
corresponding model checker FDR. In this paper, we
describe the basics of this formalism and introduce
our formal model of a railway interlocking system.
Checking this model against the given safety require-
ments, the signalling principles, we get useful counter-
examples that help to debug the given interlocking
design. This work provides a successful example of
how formal methods can be used to support the in-
dustrial development process.
Keywords: Formal methods, model checking, inter-
locking systems, process algebras.
1 Introduction
The development of railway signalling systems is cur-
rently very labour intensive and requires specialised
skills. To reduce the number of possible errors in the
process, Queensland Rail (QR), the major railway op-
erator and owner in Queensland, Australia, intends
to support its design process by a specialised tool set,
which we call the Signalling Design Toolset (SDT).
A general architecture of this design process and the
toolset is introduced in [RBK+01].
The signalling design process involves the follow-
ing documents:
• the track-layout (or signalling layout), which de-
ﬁnes the position of signals and points in a par-
ticular section of the railway system and the per-
mitted routes between the signals;
• a functional speciﬁcation for the signalling of the
given track-layout; this is currently given in form
of a so called Control Table and describes how the
general Signalling Principles, which describe the
safety requirements, are realised in this particu-
lar track-layout;
• an implementation of the Control Table in either
software or electrical relays which is called the
Interlocking.
In order to guarantee safety of a signalling sys-
tem QR manually validates the Interlocking against
the Signalling Principles. This task is labour inten-
sive and prone to error. Moreover, possible errors in
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the design are detected very late in the design pro-
cess. To overcome these problems we are aiming at
fully automatic tool support for veriﬁcation that can
be used in the early stages of design. We propose to
integrate formal methods into the design process and
to use model checking to ensure the correctness of a
design before it is implemented. This provides an ex-
ample of how industry can beneﬁt from using formal
methods during their development process.
The aim of this paper is to describe a formal model
of the functional speciﬁcation for a track-layout that
can be checked automatically against a formal model
of the Signalling Principles. We call the formal model
of the functionality of the interlocking the Interlock-
ing Model. The formal model of the Signalling Prin-
ciples is called the Principle Model. Our aim is to
translate the Control Tables into a minimal Inter-
locking model, which we then model check against
the Principles Model. Our approach, however, is lim-
ited in the size of the model since model checking
involves a complete search of the state space. For
signalling systems, this restriction implies that the
treated track-layout must not be too big.
As a formal modelling language we use, as a ﬁrst
attempt, the language of Communicating Sequential
Processes (CSP) ([Ros98]) and as the corresponding
model checker FDR ([Ros94]). CSP and the FDR
model checker are brieﬂy introduced in the next sec-
tion. Section 3 describes the functionality of an inter-
locking system that we want to formalise. The formal
Interlocking Model and the Principles Model is given
in Section 4. Checking the Interlocking Model against
the Principles Model leads to counter-examples that
help to debug the Interlocking Model. We give some
examples in Section 5 and conclude this paper with a
discussion in 6.
2 The formal modelling language CSP
In this section, we brieﬂy describe the formalism
CSP1 to the reader who is not familiar with it. Nat-
urally, this does not provide a full deﬁnition of this
language but is restricted to the main features that
we used in our model.
In CSP, a system is typically described in terms
of processes that interact or communicate. These
processes are characterised through their behaviour.
Since the language has no notion of a system’s state
the behaviour is given as a set of possible sequences
of atomic actions (events) that can be executed
(occur). We describe a single process P through a list
of choices for the next action to take. After an action
is taken the process starts choosing again. This is
speciﬁed in CSP in the following way:
1The syntax that we use here is the syntax of CSPM , which is
the machine-readable derivation of CSP introduced in [Ros98].
P = a -> P
[] b -> P
[] c -> P
The choice is marked by the [] operator and an ac-
tion followed by something else is described through
an expression of the form a -> P. The execution of
an action can be guarded. The expression
guard & a -> P
describes a simple “if-then-else” construct: if the
Boolean expression guard is true then the process ex-
ecutes action a and proceeds with process P otherwise
- if guard is not true - it terminates which is modelled
by the process STOP.
Regarding the options for a choice of actions it
is important to understand that one possible choice
has to be taken (i.e., the guard has to be satisﬁed in
the current situation) but apart from this the choice
is free. This is given through the semantics of CSP
and allows a broad variety of possible behaviour to
be modelled.
There are several ways to compose small processes
into a single big process. The small processes may run
at the same time independently without interacting
or they may depend on each other in that they have
to interact (communicate) when taking actions.
The expression
P ||| Q
describes a process that consists of sub-processes P
and Q which run independently in parallel to each
other; they can execute their actions at the same time
and do not inﬂuence each others’ choice. The gener-
alised expression
||| id:ID @ P(id)
describes the same situation for a number of pro-
cesses; the name P(id) denotes a parameterised pro-
cess where id is taken from a set of indices ID.
The expression
P [| a,b |] Q
describes a process that consists on two sub-processes
P and Q that run in parallel, however, they have to
communicate over the actions a and b. That is, P can
only perform action a or b, if the process Q performs
the same action at the same time. This is a strong
means for restricting the behaviour of a process. For
instance, if Q is a process that executes a and b alter-
natingly then P is forced to alternate these actions as
well; or if P does not contain the choice of action a at
all then Q cannot execute a either since P can never
agree on this action.
The generalised expression
[| a, b |] id:ID @ P(id)
puts a number of processes P(id) in parallel such that
they all have to agree on the actions a and b.
Actions (or what is called events in the literature)
may contain data values as well. The correspond-
ing language construct is called a channel. This no-
tion refers to the idea of message passing between
processes. The expression move.from.to denotes a
channel move that contains as data values the infor-
mation of the current location from and the next lo-
cation to the process wants to move to. from and
to can be instantiated with corresponding values,
e.g., move.office.home describes the movement
from the oﬃce to home. The expression {| move |}
describes the set of movements between all possible
locations in the system; from and to are unfolded to
every possible value, i.e., they are instantiated with
every possible location. Given this feature we can
model the following
[| {| move |} |] id:Person @ Marching(id)
This expression describes a number of marching per-
sons that all have to move at the same time from and
to the same location. If we want to loosen the restric-
tion of movement for these people, e.g., they should
only move together along a route that starts at the
central station, we can limit the unfolding of values
to those of the last parameter to only:
[| {| move.central station|} |] id:Person
@ Marching(id)
In this expression, the movement from any point other
than central station can be done individually.
The FDR tool implements an algorithm for check-
ing refinement between two given processes: One of
these processes describes our Principle Model, the
other our Interlocking Model. Between both mod-
els a reﬁnement relation is given if every possible be-
haviour of the Interlocking Model is also a possible
behaviour of the Principle Model. That is, if the
Interlocking Model allows behaviour that is not al-
lowed by the Principle Model, this indicates that the
Signalling Principles are violated by the Interlocking
Model. In this case, a counter-example is output by
the FDR tool, which shows the erroneous behaviour
of the Interlocking Model.
3 The functionality of an interlocking system
The signalling functions controlling train movements
at a particular location are known as an interlocking
(because setting one movement locks out other move-
ments). It is typically deﬁned in terms of routes from
one signal to another. A route is divided into several
tracks. In Figure 1, for instance, the route from sig-
nal s12 to s8 (called r12 1m) comprises the tracks tad
and tae. The track taz is called the overlap of route
r12 1m, i.e., the track after the signal that guards the
next route.
The interlocking speciﬁes the necessary conditions
to clear a route, which means to prepare a route such
that it can be used by a train. Example conditions
include
• the points in the route must be set to the right
direction and locked (so that they cannot be
moved).
• the tracks of the route must be proved clear of
trains.
If these conditions are true, the entry signal of the
route can be cleared (i.e., show green or yellow). Once
cleared, a route is locked by an approaching train.
This approach-locking mechanism can be released af-
ter the route is used by the train or by timing the
train to ensure it is stationary.
In our work, we use a particular track-layout as
a case study which we call the “MiniAlvey”. It is a
reduced version of the layout used in [SWD97]. Fig-
ure 1 depicts the track-layout. It is a circular layout
that comprises six tracks, two points and three sig-
nals. We distinguish four routes in this track-layout,
namely route r12 1m from signal s12 to signal s8,
route r14 1m from signal s14 to signal s8, route r8 1m
from signal s8 to signal s12, and route r8 2m from
signal s8 to signal s14. We restrict the usage of this
layout to the clockwise direction only. A train might
run from the track tab to the upper track tba or to
the lower track tac.
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s8
s12
s14
p201 p202
tba
tactab
taz
tae
tad
Figure 1: The “MiniAlvey” track-layout
4 The Formal Models
Signalling Principles deﬁne the safety properties of
an interlocking system. However, in most cases these
safety properties do not take into account the reach-
ability of system states. That is, no matter if it can
possibly happen that a train occurs on a particular
track it is stated as a safety property for all tracks
that a collision has to be avoided. Eisner (in [Eis99])
used the fact that the states to be checked need not to
be reachable by the system to reduce the model check-
ing eﬀort when applying the symbolic model checker
SMV ([McM93]).
Using the FDR, we follow a diﬀerent approach:
Since we do not want to check situations in the sys-
tem that can never occur we introduce trains into
the system that use the speciﬁed Interlocking Model.
For the behaviour of the trains, we assume that they
behave in a ’reasonable’ manner, e.g., they cannot
jump but have to move from track to track. Once we
have introduced this additional component into the
Interlocking Model it also allows us to model the Sig-
nalling Principles in terms of trains. It can be seen
that the Principle Model in terms of trains is much
simpler. We do not have to derive the restrictions for
tracks, routes, points, and signals such that safety is
guaranteed but we are able to simply formalise a safe
movement of trains on the track-layout. Safety prop-
erties speciﬁed in terms of other interlocking compo-
nents can be found in [SWD97], however, it remains
unclear how they are derived.
When modelling the behaviour of trains in the sys-
tem we have to clarify the assumptions that we used.
For instance, in the current model it is assumed that
trains always stop at a red signal. We do not con-
sider that the train-driver might fail to halt in time
but might run into the next track, the overlap. We
also simplify our notion of trains to those which are
not longer than the length of two tracks.
4.1 The Interlocking Model
Firstly, we have to model the static information
that is given by the track-layout. We identify
the entities of the system accordingly to the given
track-layout of MiniAlvey (see Figure 1), the lay-
out we want to investigate. We deﬁne the tracks
{tac,tba,tad,tae,taz,tab}, a number of signals
{s8,s12,s14}, two points {p201,p202}, and the
routes {r12 1m,r14 1m,r8 1m,r8 2m}, which are all
main routes2. For any other layout, we can easily
exchange the deﬁnition of these entities by reading
them automatically from the given track-layout ﬁle.
Moreover, we deﬁne two trains that are moving in the
2Note, that we omit in this model possible shunting and other
routes
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Figure 2: Process synchronisation in the CSP model
system, namely {FS,CR}. We also statically deﬁne a
number of relations between these entities, which we
derive from the given track-layout as well. For in-
stance, each track has a number of next tracks, which
are determined through the function next(). Usu-
ally each track has only one next-track. Only if a
track contains a point, two diﬀerent successor tracks
are possible. The function nextNormal(p201), for
instance, speciﬁes the next track if the point p201 is
set normal. All these functions are speciﬁc for a par-
ticular layout and have to be exchanged accordingly
if we want to check a diﬀerent track-layout. Other
relations are derived from the Control Tables for the
MiniAlvey. For instance, the tracks that need to be
cleared before a route can be set, the entry-signal of
each route, and the points that need to be locked and
detected for each route.
Secondly, we specify the dynamic part of the sys-
tem. This part is general for all track-layouts and
must not be changed. Guided by the features of the
CSP language, we model the behaviour of an inter-
locking system by means of several processes that in-
teract with each other: Points, Signals, Timers, and
Routes. The control of the system is decentralised,
i.e., each process actively controls its own actions. In
order to be able to check the safety of the system in
terms of moving trains, we add a process that mod-
els trains that move according to the given situation
in the interlocking system. To build up the overall
system we put these processes in parallel in such a
way that they constrain each other’s behaviour: pro-
cesses have to synchronise on the actions they may
take. The movement of a train, for instance, is con-
strained by the current aspect of the signal in front
of it; locking of a route depends on the current state
of the points that are in the route, etc. We can draw
a diagram for each operation that can be executed by
the system (see Figure 2): each process may or may
not constrain the other processes and may change its
own data values on the channels.
The diﬀerent process types as given in Figure 2
(Trains, Points, etc.) are modelled as sets of single
processes of this type that are put in parallel. For
instance, the process of Trains is deﬁned as
Trains =
[| {| SetRoute, ClearSignal,
CancelRoute |} |]id:TrainId @ Train(id)
These sets of process of the same type have to syn-
chronise over those actions that are guarded by a
predicate that ranges over all entities of that type.
For instance, for all trains it must be the case that
they are not in the route in order to set this route
(they have to synchronise on SetRoute) and fur-
thermore all trains have to agree on the operations
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for clearing a signal (ClearSignal) and cancelling a
route (CancelRoute).
Each single process (e.g., a train Train(id), a
point Point(id), etc.) is given as a parameterised
template, which is instantiated for every entity of the
interlocking system (for trains id ∈ {FS, CR}). These
templates model the rules for a suitable behaviour
of an interlocking system according to its functional
speciﬁcation. In the following, we explain the scheme
for modelling interacting processes using the example
of trains and their movement, which is restricted by
the processes Points and Signals. This should pro-
vide the reader with an understanding of our basic
modelling approach.
The process Train(id) models the functionality
of a train. An instantiation of the parameter id with
a particular train provides a process-instance with its
initial internal state. Generally, the “state” of a pro-
cess is transferred via process parameters which are
used as data values in the channels (which is an event
attached with data). We model, for instance, the
state of a train as the position of its front and rear.
These are initially both set to the track tac for the
train CR and both to the track tba for the train FS
(see below the else case).
Train(id) = if id == CR
then BehaveTrain(id.tac.tac)
else BehaveTrain(id.tba.tba)
The sub-process BehaveTrain speciﬁes the rules for
the behaviour of the train. In the example above,
BehaveTrain(CR.tac.tac) is the process that mod-
els the behaviour of train CR which is currently located
on the track tac with its front and its rear. The pa-
rameter for front- and rear-position can be changed
dynamically by the process. That is, the train can
move. The process BehaveTrain(id.ffront.rear)
is deﬁned as a list of choices for the actions a train can
take. We describe the ﬁrst two cases as an example:
BehaveTrain(id.ffront.rear) =
(([] t:next(ffront) @ ffront==rear &
Moveff.ffront.t ->
BehaveTrain(id.t.rear))
[]
( ffront!=rear &
Mover.rear.ffront ->
BehaveTrain(id.ffront.ffront))
[]. . . )
In our model, we distinguish whether the front and
the rear of the train are on the same track or on diﬀer-
ent tracks. According to this diﬀerence we introduce
two diﬀerent kinds of movements: movement of the
front (Moveff) and movement of the rear (Mover).
With these two actions a train can change its state.
Both events contain data (they are in fact channels,
see above) that precise the current location and the
next location. Moveff.ffront.t speciﬁes a move-
ment from the track where the front currently resides
to some other track t. Since t cannot be any track
but must be the next track in the track-layout, this
value is chosen from the set of next tracks given by
the function next; [] t:next(ffront) models this
choice. The condition ffront == rear guards the
movement of the front, i.e., only if both parts on the
same track the front may move forward. Otherwise
another action has to be chosen, e.g., the movement of
the rear (the second branch of the choices). After an
action is taken the process behaves like BehaveTrain
but with changed parameters: the front is now on
track t, the train has moved.
The movement of a train is also restricted through
the state of signals, routes and points. In CSP, how-
ever, it is not possible to refer to parameters of other
processes directly. We use instead the synchronisation
mechanism which is introduced above: the signal-
, point-, and route-processes have to agree and the
events Moveff and Mover in the following way:
• If a train moves (it’s front or rear) from a track
where a point is located the next track is deter-
mined by the points direction.
• A train can only move from a track where a signal
is located if the aspect of the signal is not red.
We build up the system gradually by putting pro-
cesses in parallel. The process Trains models the
set of all train-processes that are running in parallel.
Points is the process of all points. Based on these two
processes we can build up bigger processes, e.g., the
process of trains and points TrainPoints as shown
below. The ﬁrst restriction for the movement of trains
that we discussed above is treated when putting trains
and points together in the following way:
TrainPoints =
Trains [| {| Moveff.homeTrack(p201),
Moveff.homeTrack(p202),
Mover.homeTrack(p201),
Mover.homeTrack(p202) |} |] Points
Based on the track-layout, homeTrack() is a
static function that returns the location of a point.
Since the movement of a train is restricted through
points only if the train is on a track where a
point is located, the processes have to synchronise
only over movements from particular tracks, namely
homeTrack(p201) and homeTrack(p202). The sec-
ond restriction for movements of trains is treated in
a similar way. Based on the combined process Train-
Points and the process of all signals, Signals , we
combine a larger process, called TrainPointSignals,
in which trains, points and signals interact:
TrainPointSignals =
TrainPoints [| {| Moveff.homeSignal(s8),
Moveff.homeSignal(s12),
Moveff.homeSignal(s14) |} |] Signals
The static function homeSignal() returns the
track where a signal is located. The restriction
through signals is only important for the movement
of the front of a train. The movement of the rear
(modelled by action Mover) is not aﬀected by this re-
striction.
The general functionality of an interlocking sys-
tem is speciﬁed in our interlocking model by means
of 11 operations. Each of these operations can be pre-
sented as diagrams of interacting processes as shown
in Figure 2. This includes moving of trains, replac-
ing signals (i.e., setting the aspect to red), freeing the
locking of a point, setting a route, clearing a signal
(i.e., setting its aspect to yellow), locking of a route
when a train is approaching, moving a point (which
is completed with a time delay), releasing of a route
in two steps (ﬁrstly a train must be recognised on the
locked route, secondly the train is leaving the route or
if a train is halting within the route for some time),
cancelling of the route (with freeing or not freeing
the points in the route), pulling a button in order to
manually set a signal aspect to red.
All these operations are actively processed by one
or more components and also guarded by the lo-
cal state of some components of the interlocking
model. This kind of conditional operations is mod-
elled via synchronisation as shown above. The inter-
ested reader may ﬁnd an abstract description of these
operations as well as the full CSP model our technical
report [RTW01].
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4.2 The Principle Model
The two basic safety properties we want to prove for
our layout are the following:
• No collision: It never happens that two trains in
the system collide. That is, not two trains are
running on the same track at the same time.
• No derailment: No derailment of a train can oc-
cur. That is, when a train is passing a track with
a point, this point will not be moved. (We do not
currently consider other causes for derailment.)
These two safety properties are standard require-
ments for an interlocking system and are based on
a simpliﬁcation of our work on signalling principles.
We formalise these principles in terms of trains. This
provides a much higher-level of the description than
a formalisation in terms of routes, points and signals
and will ease the modelling task. Once they are for-
malised appropriately, they can be applied to each
track layout. We model these general principles as
two CSP processes. The FDR tool then allows us to
check the reﬁnement between the principle model and
the MiniAlvey model. The general idea of modelling
a principle is that we model a good behaviour that
does satisfy the principle. That is, we take a model
of arbitrary behaviour for any possible action and re-
strict this model such that it behaves for particular
actions in a prescribed, good way. In the following
we describe more concretely how this works for our
principles.
No collision of trains. In our simpliﬁed model,
two trains do not collide if they never move to the
same track. Moving onto the same track can only
happen when a train moves with its front onto an oc-
cupied track. We model this situation by means of
three processes, P, SafeMove, and CHAOS, in the fol-
lowing way: We design a process that can store the
information of two sets of tracks: one for the tracks
that are occupied by the front and one set for tracks
that are occupied by the rear of a train. Whenever a
train moves with its front onto a next track, it has to
check if this next-track is not already occupied, i.e.,
if this track is already in one of the sets of occupied
tracks. If the next track is not currently occupied and
the train moves onto this track, the sets of tracks that
are occupied by a train-front is updated correspond-
ingly (i.e., the old track is taken out of this set and
the next track is added). This can be modelled in
CSP by following process P:
P(F,R) = [] on:union(F,R) @
[] nextTr:next(on) @
( not(member(nextTr,union(F,R))) &
Moveff.on.nextTr ->
P(union(diff(F,on),nextTr),R)
[]
Mover.on.nextTr ->
P(F,union(diff(R,on),nextTr))
[]
STOP
)
The parameters of P are the sets of tracks. Param-
eter F is the set of tracks occupied by a front, R is the
set of tracks occupied by a rear. The process has three
choices of actions: either try to do a move with the
front (Moveff.on.nextTr) or do a move with the rear
(Mover.on.nextTr) or do nothing (STOP). Whenever
the process chooses an action for moving, the param-
eters of the process (i.e., the sets of occupied tracks)
are updated correspondingly. Given this process P, we
are now able to model the good behaviour of trains
as the process
SafeMove = P({tba,tac},{tba,tac})
where the parameters of P are initialised with the
tracks that are occupied by train-fronts (ﬁrst param-
eter) or train-rears (second parameter) in the initial
state (i.e., train CR is initially on track tac, and train
FS is initially on track tba). SafeMove is now put
in parallel with a process called CHAOS which is a
built-in process of CSP. This process behaves arbi-
trarily over a given set of possible actions. In our case
these actions are all actions of the interlocking system
(Events) except the move actions, Moveff and Mover
(the operator diff computes the set diﬀerence). The
move actions are excluded because the movement of
trains should happen in an ordered way, namely like
it is speciﬁed in SafeMove.
The expression
NoCollisionNetwork =
SafeMove ||| CHAOS(diff(Events,
{|Moveff, Mover|}))
deﬁnes the principles process for no collision in terms
of SafeMove and the CHAOS process. The latter pro-
cess does every action apart from moving which is
organised according to SafeMove. Given this, we
can now check that the process NoCollisionNetwork
is reﬁned by the process of the interlocking system
Network.
No derailment of trains. In our simpliﬁed model,
a derailment of a train can be caused by moving a
point when a train is moving over its track. This is
modelled by a process NoDerail which is similar to
the process SafeMove described above:
NoDerail = Q({tba,tac}, {tba,tac})
where Q is a process that models the good behaviour.
Q, as the process P above, has two parameter sets
that store the sets occupied tracks. Whenever a train
moves from a track onto a new track, these parame-
ter sets are changed correspondingly. Q also prescribes
the action MovePt in such a way that moving a point
is only possible if its home-track is not currently oc-
cupied by a train (i.e., this track is not member of
one of the parameter-sets). Q is modelled as follows:
Q(F,R) =
([] t:TrackId @ [] p:PointId @
[] d:Direction @
not(member(t,union(F,R)))
and t==homeTrack(p) &
MovePt.p.d -> Q(F,R)
)
[]
([] on:union(F,R) @ [] nextTr:next(on) @
( Moveff.on.nextTr
-> Q(union(diff(F,on),nextTr),R)
[]
Mover.on.nextTr
-> Q(F,union(diff(R,on),nextTr)))
))
[]
STOP
We put the process NoDerail in parallel with a
process CHAOS which behaves arbitrarily over all pos-
sible actions except the actions Moveff, Mover, and
MovePt. The behaviour on these actions is prescribed
by the process NoDerail.
NoDerailmentNetwork =
NoDerail ||| CHAOS(diff(Events,
{| Moveff,Mover,MovePt}))
5
The resulting process NoDerailmentNetwork is
now checked again the process Network, that models
the interlocking system. If a counterexample can be
found then this will indicate a violation of the mod-
elled good behaviour of the process NoDerail. That
is, a derailment could possibly happen.
5 Checking Results
In order to give an impression of the counter-examples
that are provided by the FDR tool in the case that
a violation of the principles could be found, we show
four examples from the many we obtained during our
work with the tool. A counter-example is a possible
run of the model that leads to a state in which the
checked principle is not satisﬁed. All four counter-
examples that are listed below violate the principle
of no collision (in some counter-examples the reader
might also ﬁnd a violation of the no derailment re-
quirement). The format of this counter-example is a
sequence of actions that the processes in the model
(Trains, Points, Signals, Routes) have agreed on.
1. A route could be set to route-reverse (SetRoute)
although some points in the route were not
locked and also leading into the wrong direction.
The FDR tool outputs the following counter-
example:
SetRoute.r12 1m
ClearSignal.s12.r12 1m
Aq Applock.s12.CR.r12 1m
Moveff.tac.tad
Replace Signal.s12
Mover.tac.tad
Pull Button.s12
Moveff.tad.tae
Mover.tad.tae
Section Release Applock.r12 1m.CR
CancelRouteLock.r12 1m
FreePoint.p202.rtN
SetRoute.r8 2m
ClearSignal.s8.r8 2m
Aq Applock.s8.CR.r8 2m
Moveff.tae.taz
Mover.tae.taz
Moveff.taz.tab
Mover.taz.tab
MovePt.p201.reverse
Moveff.tab.tba
This sequence of actions indicates the following
erroneous behaviour: The train CR can move
along route r12 1m, which was set before. It
continues to move to tracks tae, taz, and tab
after setting route r8 2m (SetRoute.r8 2m). Al-
though the route is set, the point p201 is able to
move, i.e., it obviously is not locked (since this is
a condition for moving a point). This causes the
collision of the two trains on track tba when the
train CR is moving on the wrong route. Figure 3
illustrates the movement that leads to the colli-
sion of the trains. The thick arrow shows which
way train CR moves.
Analysing our model, we found that only one
point in the route r8 2m is locked when the route
is set, namely p202. The other point, p201, did
not contribute to the action SetRoute.r8 2m.
We changed the model such that all points in
a route (this includes also the points in the over-
lap) have to agree on this action, i.e., all points
in the route have to be set properly and have to
be locked.
s8
s12
s14
p201 p202
tba
tactab
taz
tae
tad
CR
FS
Figure 3: Collision of the two trains, example 1
2. Acquiring an approach-locking did not necessar-
ily happen after a signal was cleared. As a conse-
quence, the corresponding route was not imme-
diately approach-locked and the locking of points
in the route could be freed again and the points
could move after the signal was cleared. Two
colliding routes could be set at the same time.
We changed the model such that we speciﬁed the
actions ClearSignal and Aq Applock as a se-
quence: Whenever ClearSignal is executed the
next action of the signal must be Aq Applock.
3. We may also, on purpose, introduce a bug into
the model in order to see if the given counter-
example is reasonable and understandable. For
this test, we delete one of the tracks in the static
deﬁnition of routes. Originally, the route r8m 2m
consists of the tracks {taz, tab, tac, tad}.
We delete the track tac from this set and as
a consequence get the following counter-example
when running the checks for a possible collision
of trains:
MovePt.p202.reverse
CompleteMove.p202
SetRoute.r14 1m
ClearSignal.s14.r14 1m
Aq Applock.s14.FS.r14 1m
Moveff.tba.tad
Replace Signal.s14
Mover.tba.tad
Moveff.tad.tae
Mover.tad.tae
FreePoint.p202.rtR
Pull Button.s14
Section Release Applock.r14 1m.FS
CancelRouteLock.r14 1m
MovePt.p202.normal
CompleteMove.p202
SetRoute.r8 2m
ClearSignal.s8.r8 2m
Aq Applock.s8.FS.r8 2m
Moveff.tae.taz
Replace Signal.s8
Mover.tae.taz
Moveff.taz.tab
Mover.taz.tab
Moveff.tab.tac
The sequence of actions shows that in the end
the moving train runs into a train that is still in
its initial position on track tac. This track, since
it is deleted from the tracks of route r8 2m, was
not be checked when freeing the route for being
used. Figure 4 sketches the movement that leads
to the collision.
The counter-examples output by FDR are very
useful for debugging our formalisation of the inter-
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p201 p202
tba
tactab
taz
tae
tad
CR
FS
Figure 4: Collision of the two trains, example 3
locking system. It is worth noting that even without
knowledge of the formal interlocking model the prac-
titioners were able to understand the generated cases
just by reading the meaningful names of the occurring
events in the sequence.
6 Discussion
Model checking has been applied before to the analy-
sis of interlocking systems: Gnesi et. all ([GLL+00]),
Bernardeschi et. all ([BFGM96]), and Cleaveland
et. all ([CLN96]), for instance, have addressed the
problem of fault-tolerance in interlocking systems. In
their work, the checking task is focussed on com-
munication issues between components of the system
rather than the control logic of the interlocking. The
preferred modelling language for formalising the sys-
tem are based on process algebras (e.g., CSP, CCS,
PROMELA). These languages provide suitable fea-
tures for modelling communication between compo-
nents.
Closer to our approach, is the work of Simpson,
Woodcock and Davies ([SWD97]). The formal nota-
tion CSP is used for modelling the control logic of an
interlocking system and the FDR model checker is ap-
plied to check the safety properties. However, their
model is at a lower level of abstraction than ours.
The safety invariants, namely no collision of trains
and no derailment, are modelled in terms of the sys-
tem’s components such as points, signals, routes, etc.
This formalisation of safety invariants has to be man-
ually derived from the track-layout (in the paper it is
not explained how) and, therefore, it is not obvious
if a given set of invariants is complete and covers all
eventualities.
Eisner ([Eis99]) used the symbolic model checker
SMV to analyse the interlocking logic of a given
railway yard. This approach beneﬁts from the fact
that the Signalling Principles (i.e., the safety require-
ments) are generally stated for all states of the sys-
tem. This includes also states that are practically not
reachable (e.g., non-adjacent tracks are occupied by
one train). Due to the internal algorithms for sym-
bolic model checking and for the particular form of
safety requirements that is often used, the checking
eﬀort turned out to be more eﬃcient if all states are
covered - not only the reachable ones.
We approached this observation diﬀerently: Since
FDR is not a symbolic model checker our approach
does not beneﬁt from also checking the non-reachable
states. Therefore, we restricted our model to possible
behaviour, i.e., the reachable states, by introducing
the notion of trains into the model. That is, hav-
ing a formalisation that models the interlocking sys-
tem, we model trains that use this system. They are
allowed to move arbitrarily along the tracks of the
given layout but have to follow the “general laws of
train-driving”, for instance, trains have to stop at red
signals and they are not supposed to jump or move
backwards. These “laws” can be seen as assumptions
that we made on train movements. A careful analysis
of the appropriateness of our assumptions needs to
be made by the practitioners. An ongoing discussion
with experts from QR targets this issue.
Introducing trains not only helps to reduce the
number of states that the model checker has to in-
vestigate but also lightens the task of modelling the
Principle Model, i.e., the safety requirements for the
interlocking system. As given in Section 4.2, the prin-
ciples were fairly easy to model by means of trains
running on the system.
Using CSP as a modelling language and FDR as
the corresponding model checker is our ﬁrst attempt
for supporting the analysis of interlocking systems in
the early stages of design. However, we found that
modelling languages based on process algebras, such
as CSP, are not very well suited for describing the con-
tent of a Control Table. The CSP-based models of the
interlocking system and the signalling principle is dif-
ﬁcult to understand and validate by the practitioners
and thus does not yield a good documentation for QR.
However, we found that the counter-examples that
were output by the FDR tool were easily read by rail-
way experts (even without knowledge of CSP). In our
future work, we are pursuing a diﬀerent approach that
uses a kind of guarded command language that can
be model checked. We wish to ease the understand-
ing of the formal model if it is closer related to the
tabular form that practitioners use. The ASM/SMV
approach suggested by [CW00] might be suitable: the
language of Abstract State Machines (ASM) can be
used to model the conditioned operations of the inter-
locking system and an interface to the model checker
SMV provides tool support for checking.
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